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Psychoanalytic Theory: A Historical Reconstruction 
 
In this paper I sketch a reconstruction of the basic psychoanalytic conception of the mind in 
terms of two historical resources: the conception of the subject developed in post-Kantian 
idealism, and Spinoza’s laws of the affects in Part Three of the Ethics. The former, I 
suggest, supplies the conceptual basis for the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious, 
while the latter defines the type of psychological causality of psychoanalytic explanations. 
The imperfect fit between these two elements, I claim, is reflected in familiar conceptual 
difficulties surrounding psychoanalytic theory and explanation. 
 
I 
 
Enquiry in the history of philosophy may serve a variety of purposes and assume a variety of forms. 
In addition to tracking the actual historical story of the formation of ideas, we may seek to 
illuminate the thought of historical figures by drawing systematic comparisons in the absence of any 
relation of historical influence. Longuenesse’s account of the relation between Kant’s ‘I ought’ and 
Freud’s superego fits this description, and I am in full agreement that there is insight to be had by 
drawing out systematic affinities between concepts, even when these are historically remote in the 
sense of belonging to quite different schools or traditions, or of participating in quite different 
intellectual projects, as is evidently the case with Kant and Freud. 
 Another thing which we may legitimately do, with the same end of philosophical 
illumination rather than strict historical explanation in view, is to offer systematic reconstructions of 
concepts and theories in terms of resources supplied by the history of philosophy. In this vein, I am 
going to use the space available to suggest a reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory—more 
specifically, of the basic conception of the mind evidenced in Freud’s metapsychology—in terms of 
historical materials. The reconstruction falls into two parts. The first proposes a source for the 
psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious in post-Kantian idealism. The second attempts to 
locate a point of affinity of psychoanalytic explanation with Spinoza. Although I regard the first as 
a defensible historical claim—I think it is plausible to maintain on historical grounds that the legacy 
of idealism transmits itself into Freud’s model of the mind, and I will formulate my account in such 
terms—for present purposes it can be taken in a purely systematic spirit, which is in any case how 
my second claim, concerning Spinoza, is intended. What follows may be regarded therefore as a 
purely analytical exercise cast in the form of a just so story: in a nutshell, I am suggesting that 
psychoanalytic theory may be viewed as the product of combining a conception of the subject 
developed in post-Kantian thought with a Spinozist view of the mechanics of human motivation; as 
if Freud had come up with the metapsychology as a facilitating framework for developing empirical 
psychological hypotheses through a reading of classical German philosophy and the Ethics. In the 
final section of the paper I will suggest that the idealist and Spinozist dimensions of psychoanalytic 
theory do not cohere fully, and that the tension between them is responsible for and reflected in 
certain familiar conceptual difficulties that have been held to confront Freudian theory. The ultimate 
point of the reconstruction is thus to shed some light on the famously puzzling character of 
psychoanalytic theory and explanation, in a way which bears on Longuenesse’s alignment of Kant 
with Freud. 
 
II 
 
One component of psychoanalytic theory which is both fundamental to it and, as it seems to me, not 
likely to be well accounted for by locating Freud’s metapsychology in a line of descent solely from 
developments in nineteenth-century scientific psychology, is the opposition which lies at its core 
between consciousness and the unconscious. This distinction is not simply equivalent to, even if it 
at some point involves, a distinction between mental contents characterized in terms of different 
degrees of accessibility to introspection or conscious reflection, or of different (e.g. personal vs. 
sub-personal) modes of processing (different types of) information. Rather it invokes as its starting 
point the ordinary idea of the person as a self-conscious self-determining subject, to which it then 
counterposes the notion of an enduring mental structure, capable of changing its contents over time, 
causally disposed to maintain itself in existence, systemically distinct from the network of mental 
states manifest in the stream of consciousness, and governed by a heterogeneous set of laws: a 
structure which is nonetheless posited within the orbit of the subject and held to stand in an 
intimate, immediately determining relation to conscious and self-conscious mental life. 
 This idea is, as Freud appreciated, highly puzzling: common sense psychology 
accommodates mental states which are in various ways obscure, subliminal, latent, implicit and so 
on, but nothing in it prepares for the notion that, as it has been put, I am (also) my Other. Freud of 
course spells out several justifications for the concept of the unconscious, but these are best 
regarded as essentially warrants for employing an implicitly pre-given concept, not ab initio 
explications of a novel theoretical construction. So we have the question: How, through what 
sequence of reflections, can it come to be thought that persons as ordinarily conceived harbour 
counter-selves, abiding configurations organized independently from their self-conscious 
subjectivity, their relation to which naturally draws comparison with a relation to another person, 
yet with which they are required to identify themselves?1 
                                                     
1 For a clear statement of the point, see Tugendhat 1986, pp. 131–2. The puzzle here may be 
regarded as a heightened, theoretically elaborated form of the perplexity Saint Augustine reports in 
contemplating the vastness of memory: ‘Although it is part of my nature, I cannot understand all 
that I am. This means, then, that the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely. But where is that 
part of it which it does not itself contain? Is it somewhere outside itself and not within it? How, 
then, can it be part of it, if it is not contained in it? / I am lost in wonder when I consider this 
problem. It bewilders me.’ (2002, p. 216; Book X, 8) 
 At least the rudiments of this idea can be arrived at through epistemological reflection of the 
type pursued by Kant’s immediate successors.2 The usual suspects cited when nineteenth-century 
antecedents of psychoanalysis are sought include Schelling, Romantic Naturphilosophen such as 
Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler and Gustav Carus, Eduard von Hartmann, 
and, famously, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In all of these thinkers an identification is made of the 
unconscious portion of the subject with Nature and the forces holding sway in it, which is also of 
course a foundational tenet of psychoanalysis, but in order for that identification to make sense, the 
concept of the former had to be available initially; and in order to locate that original notion, we 
need to look further back, to the first generation of thinkers occupied with the post-Kantian 
transcendental project. 
 The ground for the development of a transcendental unconscious was, in effect, prepared by 
Kant himself: in the first place through his notion (as the first Critique allows itself to be and has 
been read, whether or not correctly) that mental contents are not conscious per se, in and of 
themselves, but need to be made conscious, and that cognitive awareness of both self and objects 
involves conceptually motivated operations, comprising synthetic acts not given in inner sense; and 
second through his thesis of the necessary limit of self-knowledge which is due, not to the 
impossibility of theoretically cognizing noumena, but to the consideration that any attempt to 
cognize the self qua subject of thought ‘can only revolve in a perpetual circle’ (A346/B404), it 
being ‘very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to know 
any object’ (A402). 
                                                     
2 In what follows I am heavily indebted to Marquard’s ground-breaking study, 1987, though my 
reconstruction does not follow his account in all details. Other illuminating studies of the field 
include Assoun 1976, Redding 1999, and Völmicke 2005. Detailed discussion of major figures in 
the development of the concept of the unconscious can be found in Nicholls and Liebscher (eds) 
2010. 
 The notion that self-consciousness contains an aporia—that the ‘I or he or it (the thing) 
which thinks’ must represent itself as and only as ‘= X’, a something ‘known only through the 
thoughts which are its predicates’ (A346/B404)—undergoes a radical modification in Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre. The complex theory of mental acts which Fichte provides in its Theoretical Part 
shares with Kant’s theory of synthesis the aim of establishing the preconditions of empirical 
consciousness, but has a very different character. Kant’s agencies and acts of synthesis, though non-
conscious, can still be said to manifest themselves directly in conscious mental life, in so far as 
Kantian syntheses are necessarily discernible in—they can be read off from—the conceptually 
shaped sensible given. By contrast, Fichte’s multi-layered account of the absolute I’s positing and 
counter-positing, in which elements are cross-related in oppositional structures, identified without 
reference to recognizable types of mental representation, and form genetic series in which 
successive forms displace their predecessors, are set at a vastly greater distance from the conscious 
surface of mental life. Fichte’s speculative structures do not merely shadow what is present in 
natural consciousness but seek to bring to light its complete sufficient ground, hence their greater 
depth and remoteness. 
 What in particular screens Fichtean transcendental grounds from ordinary consciousness is 
the operation of the faculty which he calls productive imagination. The transition to empirical 
consciousness involves on his account an abrupt discontinuity, which has no conceptual 
representation and so must be effected by imagination, which converts purely intelligible structure 
into the kind of (ultimately, spatio-temporal) mental content that an empirical subject can recognize 
as its own.3 Experience depends upon an interplay and ‘clash’ of opposed components, but this is 
possible, Fichte argues, only if the ‘boundary’ between them is positively represented, which is 
something that no purely intellectual function can do: the role of productive imagination is 
accordingly to give phenomenologically concrete, intuitable form to a structure which pure thought 
can grasp only as a relation of irreconcilable mutual exclusion. Fichte draws an analogy with the 
                                                     
3 See Fichte 1982, pp. 187–8, 193–4, 200–1. 
way in which instants of light and darkness can be given in experience as alternating only if the 
boundary between them is extended into a temporal instant (Fichte 1982, pp. 187–208): in similar 
fashion, the I can grasp itself as distinct from its objects, and figure as an object for itself, only by 
relating to itself through the medium of imagination. 
 The upshot of Fichte’s account, as regards the theme that we are tracking, is complex. In one 
sense, the Wissenschaftslehre eliminates the aporia that Kant locates in self-consciousness: though 
the I qua subject cannot be given objectually within empirical self-consciousness, it is not 
unknowable, since philosophical insight into the self-positing I provides knowledge of the thing that 
for Kant remains a mere ‘= X’. In another regard, however, Fichte reaffirms and underlines the 
aporia: the genesis of empirical self-consciousness from absolute I-hood covers its tracks, and the 
standpoints of life and philosophy are distinct and exclusive, the way things appear from the one 
being an inversion of how they appear from the other.4 
 Although, for Fichte, the transcendental grounds of ordinary mental life are invisible to the 
pre-philosophical subject, the relation between them is open to full philosophical comprehension. 
Such epistemological optimism is open to challenge, however. Two figures are of particular 
importance in the present context. Kant’s early critic Salomon Maimon argued that Kant’s theory of 
empirical knowledge fails to close the gap between the a priori conditions which issue from his 
transcendental proofs, and the a posteriori contents of empirical judgement, to the advantage of 
Hume. In order to address skepticism, it is necessary, Maimon argued, to embrace a more 
rationalistic form of idealism than Kant’s. Maimon proposes accordingly a Leibnizian recasting of 
the Kantian divisions between spontaneity and receptivity, and apriority and aposteriority, in which 
what he calls ‘infinitesimals of sensation’, akin to petites perceptions and belonging to the subject 
qua passive, are postulated as the elements of synthesis, which proceeds without consciousness and 
in accordance with rules not given to our understanding. This gives rise to the appearance of an a 
posteriori sensible given. In a cognitively perfected consciousness, Maimon supposes, Kant’s 
                                                     
4 See Fichte 1982, pp. 207–8. 
divisions would be overcome, and such a subject would grasp itself and its power of cognition as 
parts of an infinite mind or reason. On Maimon’s account, the ground of sensation is located 
therefore within the subject, and derives ultimately from the deficiency of self-understanding which 
is constitutive of ordinary consciousness. 
 The same broad type of development—this time in reaction to Fichte—is found in Novalis, 
who provides a clear exposition of the shared view of Romantic post-Kantians that the ground of 
consciousness is necessarily inaccessible to discursive reflection and so must be grasped by other, 
non-discursive means. Novalis rejects Fichte’s claim that the concept of positing can lead us to the 
absolute ground of self-consciousness and empirical cognition, on the basis that the structures of 
opposition and non-identity which positing involves are themselves products of and valid only 
within our limited cognitive structure.5 The consequent problem of elucidating being prior to our 
representation of it in predicative and identity statements, is then provided with an affective-
aesthetic solution: if being qua ground of consciousness must be considered in abstraction from any 
objectual character, then its proximate manifestation within us must be similarly non-objectual, i.e., 
it must comprise a mode of consciousness which is not intentionally directed, which is as much as 
to say that it must have the character of feeling. Feeling must however stand in some relation to our 
judgementally articulated consciousness, in order for it to function as a transcendental ground. This 
relation, Novalis argues, is one of content to form, but it follows what Novalis calls the principle of 
‘ordo inversus’: reflection reverses the true relations obtaining within the subject, on the analogy 
with a mirror image, so that when reflection takes up feeling, being’s affective self-manifestation is 
lost from view, and the status of being something is attributed instead to what has been formed 
conceptually. 
 This provides a rough indication of how the post-Kantian model of the subject can evolve, 
under the momentum of transcendental reflection, in a psychoanalytic direction. The transcendental 
project, as Dieter Henrich has argued (2003, Ch. 2), aims to construct a theory of the subject in 
                                                     
5 See Novalis 2003, pp. 167–8. 
which the subject can recognize itself: it specifies the conception under which the mind operates 
and which is deployed implicitly in making those operations possible. This subjective fit provides 
one measure of validation for the theory. The transcendental image of the mind should thus be or 
correspond to—in a phrase of Richard Wollheim’s (1972)—the mind’s own image of itself. This 
conception of the end and method of transcendental enquiry does not however, as we have seen, 
bind it to representing the subject as fully self-transparent: for a variety of reasons, gaps may be 
affirmed in the transcendental theory of the mind, and where these exist, they will imply regions of 
opacity in the subject’s apprehension of its own grounds. 
 The next historical and logical step consists, as indicated earlier, in the insertion of Nature 
into the place opened up by post-Kantian transcendental reflection. The conception of the empirical 
subject as constituted by an aporetic self-relation—the mind as a dynamically self-concealing 
structure, which can open up to itself and the world only on the condition that the facilitating 
ground of its doing so is excluded from consciousness—is annexed to the philosophy of nature by 
Schelling, who first formulates explicitly the concept of the Unconscious, identifying it with the 
infinite activity of natura naturans. Schelling’s unconscious has no specific role in psychological 
explanation, but Schubert, Carus and others in his wake ascribe an unconscious to the human 
subject in an individualized form: the development of human personality is regarded as the effect of 
a subsisting unconscious core, which expresses in microcosmic form the principles, forces, and 
order of Nature at large. The final chapters in the story of progressive approximation to the 
psychoanalytic unconscious are familiar: Schopenhauer and then Nietzsche advance speculative 
hypotheses concerning the foundations of human motivation which repudiate the original 
transcendentalist association of the unconscious with rationality. 
 
III 
 
In Part Three of the Ethics, ‘Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions’, Spinoza devotes 
many pages to a systematic catalogue of the psychological laws governing the affects. On the basis 
of three ‘primary’ emotions of pleasure, pain, and desire, and their immediate derivatives, love and 
hatred (IIIP11 and IIIP13S; 2002, pp. 285, 286), Spinoza defines in Propositions 13–59 (2002, pp. 
286–311) the complex kinds of emotion which may be formed and the conditions under which they 
increase or decrease in intensity, and yield to, or are transformed into, one another. 
 Spinoza’s purpose in giving this account is, at a minimum, to bring home to us the ways in 
which, and the degree to which, our passions determine our action dispositions independently of 
anything that could be called reflective endorsement. The account thereby serves the end of 
increasing our freedom: correct insight into the causation of our passions—above all: appreciation 
that they cannot be expected to respond to reason in the way that we naively suppose—can spur us 
to adopt the less direct but truly effective measures for their regulation described by Spinoza in the 
opening pages of Part Five. 
 As commentators have observed, there is much in the Ethics that can be regarded as proto-
psychoanalytic. Spinoza envisages explanation of mental states and changes in a way that parallels 
and tracks bodily conditions and changes. Spinoza’s strict psychological determinism echoes 
Freud’s equally categorical statements on the topic. The picture of the mind as moving from one 
condition to another according to laws of efficient causality—registered by changes of hedonic state 
but not explained by invoking pleasure as an end—recalls the model that Freud draws up in his pre-
psychoanalytic Project for a Scientific Psychology and which survives recognizably in the 
‘economic’ component of the psychoanalytic metapsychology. The concept of imagination, given 
very broad scope in the Ethics and introduced primarily in order to account for the limitations of 
human cognition, is employed by Spinoza in the context of the affects in ways that show it doing 
duty for the panoply of concepts (pleasure as opposed to reality principle, primary as opposed to 
secondary process, phantasy, screen memory, etc.) employed by Freud to explain the mind’s 
capacity for operating with indifference to reality. Spinoza, like Freud, regards wish-fulfilment as 
having its basis in the fundamental structure of the mind.6 Spinoza’s assertion of the affective 
impotence of cognitions, their inability to check emotions directly by virtue of their truth alone,7 is 
mirrored in Freud’s account of the insufficiency of intellectual assent to interpretations and of the 
necessity of working-through. Spinoza anticipates Freud’s devaluation of the property of 
consciousness, if not in fact to have taken it a good deal further, in so far as consciousness barely 
figures in the Ethics, which nowhere treats it as a topic in its own right. Conatus corresponds to 
Freud’s conception of libido. And so on. 
 What I want to focus on, with a view to getting a unified perspective on these doctrinal 
points of contact of Spinoza with Freud, is the nature of Spinoza’s claims in IIIP13–59. 
 Some of the propositions advanced in IIIP13–59 are indisputably true, perhaps even, as we 
would put it, conceptual truths, while others are far from obvious and require decoding. Spinoza 
gives no explicit account of their epistemological basis, and their status is not immediately clear. In 
so far as they deal with observable patterns in the phenomena of psychological life, it would be 
natural to suppose that those which are not candidates for conceptual truth must be a posteriori, but 
it is barely conceivable in light of the method and ambition of the work as a whole, and the specific 
role of Part Three, that Spinoza should intend a mere inventory of psychological tendencies drawn 
from common observation, amounting to the inferior kind of knowledge that he calls ‘casual 
experience’ (IIP40S2; 2002, p. 267). Spinoza’s aim must be, rather, to nail down the essential 
‘logic’ of affect—in the context of the Ethics, nothing less would do. 
 This raises the expectation of being able to regard Spinoza’s propositions as a priori, and 
Spinoza does indeed spell out, in the proofs of the propositions, deductive connections with the 
foundational metaphysical claims about human beings that he has made in Part Two and the earlier 
portion of Part Three. In these proofs Spinoza’s constant reference point is his thesis of the mind’s 
                                                     
6 See IIIP13 (2002, p. 286) and IIIP28 (2002, p. 293). 
7 See IVP1 (2002, pp. 323–4), IVP7 (2002, pp. 325–6), and IVP14 (pp. 328–9). 
necessary endeavour ‘to think of those things that increase or assist the body’s power of activity’ or 
(what is the same) ‘the power of thought of our mind’ (IIIP11–13; 2002, pp. 284–6). 
 What deserves attention is the nature of the necessity whereby conatus expresses itself in the 
causation of affect. One type of necessity that we can make good sense of in the analysis of 
psychological explanation is the normative necessity associated with rational choice theory and the 
ordinary practical syllogism,8 and some of Spinoza’s propositions may look as if they can be 
expressed in such familiar terms: that he ‘who hates someone will endeavour to injure him unless he 
fears that he will suffer a greater injury in return’ (IIIP39; 2002, p. 298), for instance, might be 
considered a prudential norm. But this cannot be what Spinoza has in mind, since such rational 
necessity is manifestly absent from his claims, for example, that we shall love or hate an object 
which we imagine to be similar to an object that is wont to affect us with pleasure or pain (IIIP16; 
2002, pp. 287); that we will share the emotion of whatever we imagine to be like ourselves (IIIP27; 
2002, p. 292); that we love, desire, or hate a thing the more steadfastly, when we think it loved, 
desired, or hated by somebody else (IIIP31; 2002, p. 294); that we will seek to deprive someone of 
anything they enjoy that only one person can possess (IIIP32; 2002, p. 295); that our love for 
someone will turn to hatred if they form a more intimate bond of friendship (IIIP35; 2002, p. 296); 
that we will desire to possess a thing that gave us pleasure in the same circumstances as when we 
first took pleasure in it (IIIP36; 2002, p. 297); that we will hate someone whom we imagine to hate 
us without cause (IIIP40; 2002, p. 299) or someone imagined to be similar to ourselves who hates 
something that we love and imagine to be similar to ourselves (IIIP45; 2002, p. 301); that 
someone’s hatred of an object that he has previously loved will be proportionate to the strength of 
his former love, and vice versa (IIIP38 and IIIP44; 2002, pp. 298 and 301); that we will have higher 
regard for an object that we have not seen in conjunction with other objects or that has nothing in 
                                                     
8 Thus Davidson 2005 seems to identify causal explanation within the attribute of Thought with 
rationalization. My construal accords with the interpretation of Spinoza in Carriero 2005; see esp. 
pp. 136–41. 
common with them (IIIP52; 2002, p. 304). The vectors and tendencies of emotional life to which 
Spinoza is pointing are familiar and, as we would put it, thoroughly natural, but if we choose to 
honour them on that count with some sort of claim to some kind of rationality, it is simply because 
of their familiarity, prevalence and embeddedness in human nature, not because we suppose any 
articulable principle of reasoning or judgement of ‘rightness’ to underlie them.9 
 On a weak reading, of the sort that I offered above as a minimal characterization of his 
intentions, Spinoza would be taken to have shown only how the affects comport themselves when 
left to their own devices, information which we could regard as giving helpful forewarning of the 
ways in which our rational self-determination is prone to being subverted. This, however, would be 
to picture the affects as situated on the outside, and ourselves—as centres of rational self-
determination—on the inside, in the situation of a swimmer calculating the forces of tide and 
current. A compelling reason for thinking that this view of our situation cannot be Spinoza’s is that 
it corresponds to that of Descartes, as Spinoza construes—and explicitly rejects—it; it is to 
‘conceive man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom’ (III, Preface; 2002, p. 277).10 That a 
much stronger reading is in order becomes clear when Spinoza says that ‘mental decisions are 
nothing more than the appetites themselves’, ‘that mental decision on the one hand, and the appetite 
and physical state of the body on the other hand, are ... one and the same thing’ (IIIP2S; 2002, p. 
281);11 a claim which coheres with his declaration of intent to ‘consider human actions and 
appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies’ (III, Preface; 2002, p. 278). 
Spinoza envisages, therefore, the affects and their causation as occupying the full space of 
                                                     
9 See IIIP9S (2002; p. 284). 
10 Key points in Spinoza’s extended argument against this conception are IIP48–9 (2002, pp. 272–
7), IVP1–7 (2002, 323–6), and Part Five, Preface (2002, 363–5). 
11 A mental decision, Spinoza continues, ‘is not distinct from imagination and memory, and is 
nothing but the affirmation which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves’ (IIIP2S; 
2002, p. 282). 
psychological explanation: they are not what we qua rational beings are set over and against, rather 
they are what we are, whence their metaphysical necessity;12 the question of why we find ourselves 
subject to immediate affective determination receives its answer alongside the question of why we 
conceive physical bodies as divisible and numerable. Spinoza’s logic of affect is designed to show 
that psychological life proceeds in ways that are not driven by any power of practical reason: 
explanations with the form of practical syllogisms do not express falsehoods—human action is not 
‘blind’ in that sense—but they do not display the causal reality of the mind, since what makes them 
true, in so far as they are true, is not a grasping of normative relations. Recognition of the true, non-
normative character of psychological reality is the first step in escaping from human bondage: only 
when we have grasped that our ‘ought’ thoughts are nothing but further expressions of conatus, 
without sui generis reality, are we in a position to steer ourselves in the appropriate therapeutic 
direction.13 There is therefore a good sense in which the ordinary concept of a reason for action 
does not survive the Ethics.14 Spinoza’s interchangeable use of ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ gives notice of 
this.15 
 What should accordingly strike us when we consider IIIP13–59 with Freud in mind is the 
remarkable parallel of Spinoza’s explanations by and of emotion with psychoanalytic explanations, 
                                                     
12 Which is why achieving freedom is associated with the metaphysical modification of our 
identity—identification with the immortal part of the mind—described in Part Five. 
13 Whence Nietzsche’s praise of Spinoza for restoring the world’s ‘innocence’ (1994, p. 50; Essay 
II, §15). Spinoza describes himself as seeking to ‘understand’ the emotions and actions of men 
rather than ‘abuse or deride’ them (III, Preface; 2002, p. 277). 
14 This is of course very far from a complete analysis, which leaves aside the special case where 
reason has become determining; my intention is simply to highlight points of relevance to 
psychoanalysis. On Spinoza’s complex theory of agency, see Koistinen 2009. 
15 See IP11, Second Proof (2002, p. 222). Also relevant is the famous comparison of a person’s 
consciousness of their agency with the thinking of a stone in motion (Letter 58; 2002, pp. 908–10). 
which similarly appear—from the standpoint of common sense psychology—to be poised 
awkwardly on the border separating reasons from mere causes. Just as it would make no sense to 
cite the inherent tendency of love to convert itself into hatred in the circumstances detailed in IIIP35 
as a reason for regarding a person with hatred, so similarly unconscious determinants as such 
cannot be incorporated into our self-reflection as justifications for our actions or propositional 
attitudes. And yet, nor are these forms of causation correctly described as merely mechanical: the 
relations between cause and effect are internal, and the effects are intelligible in light of their 
postulated causes.16 There is no space here to go into detail, but I think it would not be hard to 
show, with reference to Freud’s own texts and to typical psychoanalytic case histories, that the 
explanatory base-line in psychoanalytic explanation consists in the interaction of elements in 
psychic reality in ways which fuse (in a way that at once illuminates and puzzles) activity of 
thought with forms of activity conceptualized in terms of movements of organic and even inorganic 
bodies. 
 The shared nature of Spinozistic and psychoanalytic explanation—their fusion of thought 
and mechanism into a single form of efficient causality—is reflected in the points of doctrinal 
covergence listed above. Other revisionary claims concerning the human subject defended in the 
Ethics with conspicuous psychoanalytic resonance include Spinoza’s reductive conception of the 
self, his rejection of free will, his use of the concept of expression as a linchpin of psychological 
explanation, his overhauling of the common sense taxonomy of mental states, and his argument that 
the very fact of failures of reason suffices to falsify the kingdom-within-a-kingdom conception of 
the subject.17 
                                                     
16 Of interest here is the sketch of a psychoanalytic logic of affect in Alexander 1935, which 
attempts to coordinate talk of ‘emotional syllogisms’ with the modelling of mental processes on 
bodily functions. 
17 ‘But my argument is this: in Nature nothing happens which can be attributed to its defectiveness, 
for Nature is always the same, and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the same; 
 IV 
 
My answer to the question posed earlier—whence the psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious?—is therefore that Spinoza’s logic of affect can be thought to mesh with the idealist 
conception of self-concealing subjectivity, yielding a model of the mind which approximates to that 
of psychoanalysis: in rough outline, the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious is the product 
of substituting for the synthetic acts of transcendental subjectivity, postulated by the 
idealist/transcendentalist with a view to solving problems of epistemology and metaphysics, the 
sorts of contents and operations which Spinoza postulates with a view to explaining human action 
and affect. Freud has accordingly a foot in two distinct camps: the humanistic tradition of classical 
German philosophy, in which cognitive and ethical tasks are conceived and pursued from the 
internal standpoint of the subject, and the alternative naturalistic programme of modern philosophy. 
 This seems to me a fair representation of the intellectual forces which come together in 
Freud’s notion of the unconscious, and it accords well with the salient facts of psychoanalysis’ 
historical reception—to wit, the huge appeal which psychoanalytic ideas have had across the board 
in the humanities for over a century, alongside the determined attempt, to the fore in the North 
American psychoanalytic tradition, to hold psychoanalysis fast (for better or worse) to the agenda of 
the natural sciences.18 It is difficult to see that any more economical hypothesis could account for 
the extraordinary depth of disagreement separating different schools of psychoanalytic thought, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
that is, the laws and rules of Nature according to which all things happen and change from one form 
to another are everywhere and always the same’ (III, Preface; 2002, p. 278). Also relevant are 
IIIP2S (2002, pp. 281–2), on the cognitive illusion of the distinctness of mental decision, and the 
deflationary remarks on perfection in the Preface to Part Four (2002, pp. 102–3). 
18 Kitcher 1992 provides a sophisticated version of this approach. 
ranging as it does from deconstructionist and neo-Nietzschean appropriations of Freud to the 
interpretation of psychoanalysis as proto-neurophysiology. 
 Representing psychoanalysis as an attempt to unite in a single concept two major and 
distinct trajectories in modern philosophy throws light on the theory and accounts for the double 
character of Freud’s notion of the unconscious, but by the same token makes clear the difficulty 
which it faces. On the one hand, the legacy of idealism showing itself, Freud asks that we avow the 
unconscious, that we regard it as our own, while on the other he insists, in line with Spinoza, that 
the real forms of motivational causation are incongruent with the image of action as proceeding 
from a centre of self-conscious self-determination. This combination of claims is what forces out 
the characterization of the unconscious as the ‘Other’ of consciousness. The extended debate in the 
philosophy of psychoanalysis concerning whether psychoanalysis is a form of causal explanation or 
of reason explanation, reflects this duality.19 So too does the puzzle, which has also given rise to an 
inconclusive literature, concerning the coherence of supposing that bona fide mental states, of the 
sort attributed in psychoanalytic explanation, can subsist without consciousness. 
 The problem can be put in sharper focus if we contrast the relation to common sense 
psychology required for psychoanalytic explanation with the situation of Spinoza. As my earlier 
discussion emphasized, Spinoza’s intentions are uncompromisingly revisionary. If Spinoza is not an 
eliminativist regarding common sense psychology, he comes within a hair’s breadth of being one. 
Psychoanalytic theory cannot, however, mean to follow Spinoza’s hard line, because its own 
distinctive forms of explanation are interwoven with those of common sense psychology, and its 
own concept of the unconscious is formulated with reference to and as the counterpart of the 
ordinary conception of the subject. 
                                                     
19 As Ricoeur puts it, the ‘aporia’ of psychoanalysis, ‘the whole problem of the Freudian 
epistemology’, may be ‘centralized in a single question’ concerning the integration of 
‘interpretation that necessarily moves among meanings’ with explanation by forces, and 
‘Freudianism exists only on the basis of its refusal of that disjunction’ (1977, pp. 66–7). 
 The consequences of this conceptual compromise—psychoanalysis’ adoption of Spinozistic 
explanation, without acceptance of its revisionary implications—are reflected in Sartre’s critique of 
Freud, the nub of which is contained in the following passage: 
 
By rejecting the conscious unity of the psyche, Freud is obliged to imply everywhere a 
magic unity linking distant phenomena across obstacles, just as sympathetic magic unites 
the spellbound person and the wax image fashioned in his like. The unconscious drive 
(Trieb) through magic is endowed with the character ‘repressed’ or ‘condemned’, which 
completely pervades it, colours it, and magically provokes its symbolism. Similarly the 
conscious phenomenon is entirely coloured by its symbolic meaning although it can not 
apprehend this meaning by itself in clear consciousness. (Sartre 1958, pp. 53–4) 
  
This claim is explained more fully in Sartre’s essay on the emotions: 
 
The psychoanalytic interpretation [of an emotion] conceives the conscious phenomenon as 
the symbolic realization of a desire repressed by the censor. Note that, for consciousness, the 
desire is not involved in its symbolic realisation. In so far as it exists by and in our 
consciousness it is only what it gives itself out to be: emotion, desire for sleep, theft, laurel-
phobia, etc. If it were otherwise, if we had any consciousness, even only implicit, of the real 
desire, we should be in bad faith, and that is not what the psychoanalyst means. (Sartre 
2004, p. 30) 
 
So the relation between an emotion and the signification conferred on it under a psychoanalytic 
interpretation must, to some degree, resemble the relation of the ashes of a fire extinct upon a 
mountain to those who lit it. And yet, Sartre points out, it cannot be merely external. For the 
psychoanalyst ‘there is always an internal analogy between the conscious fact and the desire it 
expresses, since the conscious fact is symbolical of the expressed complex’: the symbolic character 
of the conscious fact ‘is constitutive of it’. This, however, leads us back in a circle, to the 
identification of unconscious motivation with mere bad faith: ‘if symbolization is constitutive it is 
legitimate to see an immanent bond of comprehension between the symbolization and the 
symbol’—’the relation between symbol, symbolized and symbolization is an intra-structural bond 
of consciousness’ (Sartre 2004, p. 32).  
 The problem that Sartre describes, expressed in terms of my historical reconstruction, is 
therefore that psychoanalytic explanation invokes the conception of the unity of the mind and of the 
nature of relations between mental elements contained in our common sense self-conception, 
elaborated in the Kantian tradition, and also models the mind in terms of Spinoza’s patterns of 
causation, from which the same degree and type of reflexive unity is absent. The psychoanalytic 
concept of symbolization is a bridge, not just from unconscious to conscious facts, but also from the 
the one philosophical model of the subject to the other, and the strain which it is under reflects the 
way in which psychoanalytic theory merely superimposes—grafts onto one another, without 
integrating—the two different models of the mind.20 
 There are, to be sure, ways of softening the impact of Sartre’s criticism. We may, for 
instance, postulate some species of mental connection mid-way between immanent bonds of 
comprehension, and merely external causal linkages of the fire & ashes sort. And it is clear 
furthermore that in doing so we may claim a degree of support from common sense psychology 
(which does not, after all, assimilate all ‘bonds of comprehension’ to the clear-cut case of knowing 
the meaning of a sign, as Sartre perhaps tends to imply). Moves of this sort can be given plausibility 
through being inter-related with one another in a systematic way. Psychoanalysis can thus be 
presented as an extension of common sense psychology. What I think nonetheless needs to be 
                                                     
20 Sartre does not, however, reject symbolic interpretation as such, and towards the end of Being 
and Nothingness he proposes what he considers a superior conceptualization: see Sartre 1958, pp. 
602–15. 
recognized as the substantial truth in Sartre’s criticism—and which in no way depends upon his 
professed Cartesianism—is his insight that, to the extent that we extend common sense psychology 
by proposing a new species of mental state or relation, even though each individual theoretical 
move in the construction of the extension may have an adequate local justification, there is a sense 
in which the cumulative effect of the incremental changes is a philosophical loss of bearings; in 
historical shorthand, we wonder how, starting with Kant, we could have ended up with Spinoza. 
This is quite compatible with the resulting theory’s working perfectly well as an explanatory system 
in accordance with criteria appropriate to empirical theories; what it means is only that we cannot 
render the theory philosophically perspicuous.21 
 One way in which the problem might be resolved decisively is through an expansion of the 
boundaries of the self, in a way that permits reconception of the unconscious in terms that make full 
metaphysical sense of the identification with it demanded by psychoanalysis. If the Nature that 
feeds into my unconscious is in reality more of myself, if it is a whole with which I am in some 
sense identical, then it is false that, as Sartre puts it, ‘I am ego but I am not id’ (1958, p. 50): rather, 
the unconscious is a continuation of me. This view of the metaphysics of human personality is, in 
                                                     
21 Deconstructionist and neo-Nietzschean readings of Freud and applications of psychoanalytic 
ideas, referred to earlier, construe psychoanalytic theory as engaged in (negative) metaphysical 
assertion. This removes the problem under discussion, since if at the heart of Freud’s theory of the 
mind stands the claim that the concept of the person or subject is incoherent and/or that the reality 
in which persons and subjects consist does not permit coherent conceptualization, then the theory is 
freed from the tension I have been exploring and the inconsistency alleged by Sartre: the tension 
and inconsistency are relocated in the concept which is the theory’s object. What this approach may 
be right about is that psychoanalysis counts among its data the difficulty which subjects encounter 
in conceiving themselves in the terms that psychoanalysis recommends, in other words, in relating 
themselves to their unconscious states, but it is not plausible to construe Freudian theory, as a 
whole, as a consistently skeptical meta-theory. 
fact, the picture proposed (for epistemological and metaphysical reasons) by Schelling. It amounts 
of course to a revision of the common sense view of the borders of the self, but it conserves, unlike 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, the notion of self-conscious self-determination. However, it also, plainly, 
requires attributing to Nature properties that disenchanted modern natural science denies it, and 
though a hint of a preparedness to retrieve nineteenth-century Romantic idealism can be found in a 
very few psychoanalytic thinkers22—and arguably receives encouragement from Freud’s late 
remarks on Eros and Thanatos—it is in flat contradiction with Freud’s official account of the 
psychoanalytic Weltanschauung and not likely to be regarded as an acceptable condition for 
securing the conceptual integrity of psychoanalysis. 
 Where does all this leave psychoanalysis, as regards its systematic evaluation? The larger 
issues which arise concerning the long-running debate concerning psychoanalysis’ claim to truth 
obviously cannot be pursued here, but I have a limited suggestion, arising from the preceding 
discussion. 
 One reaction to my account—which will recommend itself to those unimpressed by 
psychoanalysis’ claim to psychological insight—is to take the diagnosis implied by the historical 
reconstruction as the basis for a quick conviction. The empirical defensibility of psychoanalytic 
claims is a matter for another occasion, but if the roots of psychoanalysis’ conceptual difficulties lie 
as deep as I have suggested, namely in a collision of transcendentalist with naturalist commitments, 
then it may reasonably be held that the reemergence of this overarching philosophical antinomy in 
the psychoanalytic context—albeit in an especially overt, acute, aggravated form—cannot be a 
reason for impugning the theory’s claim to offer genuine psychological explanation. Psychoanalysis 
ought not to be made a casualty of our inability to resolve what is at the end of the day a wholly 
                                                     
22 Loewald concludes, after consideration of the ‘reconciliation of the subject-object dichotomy’ 
involved in sublimation (1988, p. 20), that psychoanalysis refers us to a natura naturans 
characterized by a subjectivity vaster than ‘human individual mentation’ (1988, pp. 79–80). Also of 
high interest is the discussion in Lear 1990, Ch. 5. 
general philosophical problem. Acknowledging the ambiguity concerning the personal vs. 
Spinozistic status of the unconscious, and accepting that the theory does not explicate itself in a 
fully coherent manner, is an acceptable price to pay for a picture of human beings that makes sense 
of stretches of human experience which will otherwise be left completely opaque. 
 In so far as Longuenesse and I differ, our difference lies in our respective attitudes to the 
proposed unification of Kant’s ‘I ought’ and Freud’s superego. This Longuenesse regards as an 
unproblematic theoretical unification, which promises to help out Kant’s ethical theory, by 
transposing a questionable transcendentalist conception into a secure naturalistic context. In my 
view, waiving all questions about the capacity of Kant's conception of morality to survive the move 
intact, the proposal draws attention to an underlying bifurcation in psychoanalytic thought, which I 
have modelled in terms of its derivation from incongruent historical sources. One of these, the 
Spinozistic, is antithetical to Kantian ways of thinking. This alone does not exclude Longuenesse’s 
proposal, since, I have argued, psychoanalysis is not consistently Spinozistic. It may be true, 
therefore, that there are aspects of Freud’s metapsychology which accord with Kant's concepts. The 
problem, however, is that psychoanalysis is not consistently Kantian, either, and that its ambiguity 
cannot be resolved in either the one direction or the other. This should not, I have urged, be made an 
objection to psychoanalysis. But if correct, it means that psychoanalysis does not offer a 
philosophically safe home for Kant’s ‘I ought’ to the extent that Longuenesse supposes. 
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